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Open access under CC BEmpirical investigation of the external ﬁnance premium has been conducted on the margin between
internal ﬁnance and bank borrowing or equities but little attention has been given to corporate bonds,
especially for the emerging Asian market. In this paper, we hypothesize that balance sheet indicators
of creditworthiness could affect the external ﬁnance premium for bonds as they do for premia in other
markets. Using bond-speciﬁc and ﬁrm-speciﬁc data for China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Philippines,
Singapore and Thailand during 1995–2009 we ﬁnd that ﬁrms with better ﬁnancial health face lower
external ﬁnance premia in all countries. When we introduce ﬁrm-level heterogeneity, we show that
ﬁnancial variables appear to be both statistically and quantitatively more important for ﬁnancially con-
strained ﬁrms. Finally, when we examine the effects of the 1997–1998 Asian crisis and the 2007–2009
global ﬁnancial crisis, we ﬁnd that the sensitivity of the premium is greater for constrained ﬁrms during
the Asian crisis compared to other times.
 2012 Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY license.1 A large and growing set of empirical studies has documented the extent to which
the ﬁnancing constraint dimension inﬂuences ﬁrms’ ﬁxed investment and employ-1. Introduction
The last decade and a half has seen phenomenal growth in the
theoretical and empirical investigation of corporate ﬁnancial deci-
sions through imperfect credit markets. Building on the pathbreak-
ing theoretical work of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) on asymmetric
information, Chari et al. (1995), Bernanke et al. (1999), Christiano
et al. (2003, 2007, 2010) and Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007) pro-
vide an agency cost model of external borrowing from ﬁnancial
markets. Among the many implications of this literature is the
observation that corporate ﬁnancial structure will differ in relation
to the observable characteristics used by lenders to determine
their creditworthiness (Gertler and Gilchrist, 1994), and will be
affected by constraints arising from the availability and cost of
external ﬁnance to ﬁrms.
It is generally accepted that ﬁrms that are constrained on the
ﬁnancial markets, will face higher agency costs of borrowing – a
higher ‘external premium’ – for raising capital from ﬁnancial
markets compared with the cost of internal ﬁnance funded from; fax: +44 (0) 141 330 4940.
P. Mizen), serafeim.tsoukas@
Y license.retained earnings as explained by Bernanke and Gertler (1995)
with subsequent effects on real activity.1
Furthermore, the external premium can vary with macroeco-
nomic conditions that bring about sharp reductions in lending dur-
ing credit crunches or recessions. Levin et al. (2004) measure
expected default risk and credit spreads on publicly-traded debt
for US non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms, ﬁnding that ﬁnancial market frictions
exhibit strong cyclical patterns.2 Our data show that Asian emerging
markets saw the average spread on corporate bonds issued by all
ﬁrms leap from 100–200 basis points to around 1200 basis points
during the Asian crisis of 1997, followed by a persistent drop in vol-
umes (also noted in Eichengreen et al. (2006)). We also show that in
the recent global ﬁnancial crisis the average spread rose less dramat-
ically, from approximately 200 basis points to around 600 basis
points. We are not aware of any studies that compare the effect of
these crises on the external ﬁnance premium.ment decisions under imperfect ﬁnancial markets (see Fazzari et al., 1988; Guariglia,
2008 and Spaliara, 2009). The degree of sophistication of the relationship between
ﬁnancial variables and real activity is further reﬂected in papers by Levin et al. (2004),
Covas and Wouter (2007) and Gilchrist et al. (2009).
2 This result is also supported by Mody and Taylor (2004) and Gilchrist et al. (2009)
who consider the movement of the external ﬁnance premium as a predictor for real
economic activity.
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teristics, ﬁnancial constraints and the impact of the 1997 Asian cri-
sis and the recent global ﬁnancial crisis on the external ﬁnancial
premium at the level of the individual ﬁrm. Much of the empirical
investigation of the external ﬁnance premium has been conducted
on the margin between internal ﬁnance and bank borrowing or on
the margin for raising external ﬁnance through equity markets, but
we focus on bond markets.3 Bond ﬁnancing appears to be increas-
ingly important for ﬁrms in Asian economies since the ASEAN coun-
tries have encouraged deeper, more integrated sovereign and
corporate bond markets through initiatives such as the Pan Asian
Bond Index Fund (PAIF), the Fund of Bond Funds (FoBF) and the Asian
Bond Market Initiative (ABMI) proposal.4 At the end of 2007, the se-
ven Asian economies included in this study – China, Hong Kong,
Indonesia, Korea, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand - had foreign
currency bonds outstanding of over $324 billion. This ﬁgure stands
in sharp contrast with $77 billion outstanding in 1995. It represents
a signiﬁcant increase in foreign ﬁnancing through bond markets fol-
lowing the Asian crisis, suggesting the Asian corporate bond market
is better able to provide external ﬁnance to ﬁrms compared with a
decade earlier.
The present study improves on the existing empirical studies in
three important ways. First, we provide a ﬁrm-level study of the
response of premia in emerging Asian bond markets that takes full
account of the heterogeneity of Asian ﬁrms operating in China,
Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.
We seek to determine whether the external ﬁnance premium, as
measured by the credit spread, is inversely related to the strength
of the balance sheet, and therefore whether ﬁrms with better
ﬁnancial health face lower external ﬁnance premia and vice versa.
Second, because there is considerably greater information
asymmetry in Asian countries due to the limited engagement with
internationally comparable ratings agencies and lower reporting
requirements, we expect ﬁnancing constraints to be more likely
to affect pricing in the bond markets than in Western countries.
Our work considers the external premium for ﬁnancially con-
strained and unconstrained ﬁrms using criteria consistent with
the literature on ﬁnancing constraints (see Fazzari et al., 1988;
Guariglia, 2008 and Spaliara, 2009).
Third, we document for the ﬁrst time the differences in the
responses to the Asian crisis and the recent global ﬁnancial crisis
for constrained and unconstrained ﬁrms in Asia. We ﬁnd that con-
strained ﬁrms were more sensitive to ﬁnancial variables than
unconstrained ﬁrms, and that they were more sensitive during
periods of ﬁnancial crisis. In the Asian crisis these ﬁrms experi-
enced higher premia when they had greater leverage or risk of
bankruptcy. During the recent ﬁnancial crisis the premium was
more responsive to proﬁtability and return on equity, and less
responsive to leverage or risk.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides
a brief theoretical framework for analysis of the external ﬁnance
premium based on Bernanke et al. (1999). Section 3 describes the
empirical speciﬁcations and econometricmethodology. In Section 4
we document our data sources and provide some summary statis-
tics. Section 5 presents the empirical evidence and Section 6
concludes.3 The bank borrowing literature includes papers by Kashyap et al. (1993) and
Bernanke and Gertler (1995). Equity premia are investigated by Campello and Chen
(2010) and Whited and Wu (2006). This strand of literature is concerned with
questions central to ﬁnance such as the nature of equity returns and risk pricing
rather than the implications of the scale of the external ﬁnance premium for the
ﬁnancial accelerator as such.
4 According to Eichengreen et al. (2006), East Asian markets are larger when
assessed relative to other emerging markets such as the Latin American economies.2. Theoretical background
Theoretical models incorporating ﬁnancial accelerator effects
are particularly useful in demonstrating how balance sheet indica-
tors inﬂuence access to external ﬁnance. The inﬂuential paper by
Bernanke et al. (1999) provides the theoretical basis for our paper,
but we could equally have taken one of the models by Chari et al.
(1995), Christiano et al. (2003, 2007, 2010), or Smets and Wouters
(2003, 2007).
The Bernanke et al. (1999) model incorporates the costly-state
veriﬁcation (CSV) debt contracting problem into an otherwise stan-
dard dynamic New Keynesian general equilibrium model. In the
model there are three agents: households, entrepreneurs, and
retailers. Entrepreneurs, who are assumed to be risk-neutral and
have ﬁnite horizons, acquire physical capital Ktþ1 at a price Qt at
the end of period t, for use in production in period t + 1. At the
end of period t entrepreneur j has available net worth Njtþ1 and ﬁ-
nances capital with internal funds supplemented by external bor-
rowing from a ﬁnancier: Bjtþ1 ¼ QtKjtþ1  Njtþ1. Ex ante, the
expected revenue from the investment project is given by
Rktþ1QtK
j
tþ1, where R
k
tþ1 is the aggregate gross rate of return on cap-
ital investment. The realized revenue in the next period is given by
xjRktþ1QtK
j
tþ1, where xj is a productivity disturbance which is i.i.d.
across ﬁrms and time.
Adopting the CSV approach, an agency problem arises because
ﬁnanciers cannot observe xj and need to pay an auditing cost if
they wish to observe the outcome. The ﬁnancial contract is a stan-
dard debt contract including the following bankruptcy clause:
If xj P xj the entrepreneur pays off the debt in full from reve-
nues and keeps the residual. The ﬁnancier receives xjRktþ1QtK
j
tþ1 ¼
Zjtþ1B
j
tþ1, where Z
j
tþ1 is the non-default rate on debt.
Ifxj < xj the ﬁrm defaults on its loan. The lender pays an audit-
ing cost l and receives what is found, namely ð1 lÞ xjRktþ1QtKjtþ1.
A defaulting entrepreneur receives nothing.
It is reasonable to assume that the ﬁnancier will accept debt
only if the expected gross return to the entrepreneur equals the
ﬁnancier’s opportunity cost. Because the debt risk is perfectly div-
ersiﬁable, the relevant opportunity cost to the ﬁnancier is the risk-
free rate Rtþ1. Consequently, the ﬁnancier’s expected return is a
function of xj, the default trigger. Higher levels of xj raise the
non-default pay off to the ﬁnancier, but also raise the probability
of default ðFð xÞÞ .
The Bernanke et al. (1999) model is concerned with the entre-
preneur’s problem of demand for capital. In this model the cost
of ﬁnance depends on the ﬁnancial health of ﬁrms and is negatively
associated with the level of internal funds (net worth, Ntþ1) relative
to total ﬁnancing requirements. Let s ¼ E R
k
tþ1
Rtþ1
h i
be expected dis-
counted return on capital.5 Then
Et ½Rktþ1 ¼ s
Nt
QtKtþ1
 
Rtþ1 ð1Þ
The above equation shows how the ﬁrm’s return on capital depends
inversely on the share of the ﬁrm’s capital investment ﬁnanced by
its own net worth. If the ﬁrm can self ﬁnance its investment pro-
jects, there is no need for external ﬁnancing and the equilibrium re-
turn to capital is equal to the risk-free rate. In this case the external
ﬁnance premium is zero. Similarly, if the ﬁrm needs to borrow, the
required return on capital will be higher reﬂecting expected agency
costs faced by the ﬁnancier, and the premium will reﬂect this. Thus,
the initial ﬁnancial position of the entrepreneur becomes a key
determinant of the cost of external ﬁnance.5 As Bernanke et al. (1999) suggest, the ratio of the cost of ﬁnance to the risk-free
rate may be equally well interpreted as the external ﬁnance premium.
6 See Choi and Park (2002) for details on the approximation of a bond portfolio
yield.
7 See Güntay and Hackbarth (2010) for a similar approach on the deﬁnition of
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can be seen from the deﬁnition of aggregate entrepreneurial net
worth: Ntþ1 ¼ cVtþ1 þWetþ1. Bernanke et al., 1999 assume that
entrepreneurs supplement their income by working in the general
labor market. Thus, the aggregate net worth is the sum of the
entrepreneurial equity (Vtþ1) and the entrepreneurial wage W
e
tþ1.
Entrepreneurial equity equals earnings from capital employed
from t to t þ 1 minus the debt repayment
Vtþ1 ¼ Rktþ1QtKtþ1  ðRtþ1 þ EFPtÞðQtKtþ1  NtÞ ð2Þ
with
EFPt ¼
l
R x
0 xR
k
tþ1QtKtþ1dFðxÞ
QtKtþ1  Nt
ð3Þ
where EFPt is the ratio of default costs to the amount borrowed and
reﬂects the premium for external ﬁnance.
Eq. (3) connects the theory with our empirical approach in the
following sections. Changes in net worth will affect the spread be-
tween the contractual rate ondebt or bond and the risk-free rate. This
couldbeaffectedby theproﬁtability of theﬁrm, its returnonequityor
its indebtedness. For example, if a ﬁrm is highly leveraged, a shock to
project returns will have a larger impact on internal funds (and the
EFP) compared to a ﬁrm that has lower leverage. An investor may
demand a higher premium if the ﬁrm is perceived to be more risky,
as measured by a bankruptcy risks measure like the Altman Z-score.
The shock xj is idiosyncratic to the ﬁrm in the Bernanke et al.
(1999) version of the model, but it is equally possible to interpret
an adverse shock as a negative outcome triggered by a crisis event
as we have discussed in the introduction. Indeed, the most recent
papers in this literature have considered shocks that emanate from
sources other than the ﬁrm, and especially from the ﬁnancial sys-
tem (c.f. Christiano et al. (2010)). While lenders can diversify to
counter idiosyncratic shocks, it is more difﬁcult to completely
avoid exposure to shocks that are common to a region (an Asian
crisis) or global shocks (the global ﬁnancial crisis). Lenders may in-
stead raise premiums to compensate for the higher risks that they
take when crises occur, which tends to amplify further the coun-
tercyclical response in the external ﬁnancial premium.
Empirical evidence on the external ﬁnance premium is provided
by de Bondt (2004), who considers the emerging euro bond mar-
ket, examining the impact of macroeconomic and ﬁnancial health
indicators on the corporate bond spread with Granger causality
tests, multiple regressions and impulse responses. Despite a short
sample of data the results suggest there is evidence of a balance
sheet channel in operation that inﬂuences bond spreads. In addi-
tion, Campello and Chen (2010) address risk pricing in equity mar-
kets. They report evidence that equity returns of ﬁnancially
constrained US ﬁrms command higher ex ante excess risk premia
and these premia move countercyclically with economic and ﬁnan-
cial conditions. Our study, however, is concerned with the Asian
bond markets which is important since the value of bonds issued
by emerging economies has increased rapidly during the last two
decades (Genberg and Sulstarova (2008)).
3. Empirical implementation
3.1. Baseline speciﬁcation
In this paper we assess the external ﬁnance premium on the
bond market using an economic approach which fully reﬂects the
impact of information asymmetry between the borrower and the
external ﬁnancier embedded in the theoretical analysis by Berna-
nke et al. (1999).
We consider the following baseline model:
yit ¼ ai þ Xitbþ Zitcþ it ð4Þwhere i = 1, 2, . . ., N refers to a cross section of units (ﬁrms in this
study), t = 1, 2, . . ., T refers to time period, and yit denotes the depen-
dent variable, while Xit denotes the vector of explanatory variables
for the ﬁrm i and year t and Zit refers to characteristics of the bonds
issued. ai is a vector capturing ﬁrm-speciﬁc intercepts, b and c are
coefﬁcient matrices, and it are the disturbance terms that vary with
time and across ﬁrms. To control for cyclical factors originating
from the business cycle we include time dummies in our regres-
sions, we also incorporate industry dummies to control for ﬁxed ef-
fects across industries. We include country dummies to control for
any country-based institutional differences. Finally, all our standard
errors are White-corrected, which are robust to within cluster cor-
relation. We cluster by ﬁrm to allow for the fact that observations
over time may be correlated within each ﬁrm but must be indepen-
dent across ﬁrms.
The dependent variable is the external ﬁnance premium on cor-
porate bonds, measured as the spread between corporate bond
yields and Treasury bond yields. To calculate an overall ﬁrm-spe-
ciﬁc corporate bond yield, we averaged the yields on the ﬁrm’s out-
standing bonds, using the product of market values of bonds and
their effective durations as weights.6 Thus, YTMcorp ¼
PN
i¼1yiPiDiPN
i¼1PiDi
,
where yi is the yield to maturity on the ith bond, Pi and Di are the
market value and the duration of the ith bond, respectively. The
credit spread is the difference between yield to maturity for corpo-
rate and government bonds: SPREAD ¼ YTMcorpt;T  YTMgovt;T , where
YTMcorpt;T represents the yield to maturity at time t of a corporate bond
that matures at time T and YTMgovt;T the yield to maturity of a govern-
ment bond with the same maturity.7
Vector Xit includes a set of ﬁnancial variables that capture the
role of ﬁnancial health as suggested by the theoretical model of
Bernanke et al. (1999) and the previous empirical literature on
the determinants of credit spread. In particular, structural models
of Black and Scholes (1973) or Merton (1974) relate the credit
event to the ﬁrm’s asset value and capital structure. A ﬁrm defaults
on its debt if its asset value falls bellow its debt value. Accordingly,
we employ the following ﬁrm-speciﬁc ﬁnancial variables: leverage,
proﬁtability, return on equity and a control for idiosyncratic prob-
ability of bankruptcy, namely the Z-score. We introduce leverage
(LEV) deﬁned as total debt over total assets, as a measure of ﬁrms’
indebtedness, since Bougheas et al. (2006); Spaliara (2009) and Lu
et al. (2010) argue that higher leverage implies a weaker balance
sheet. Thus we expect high levels of leverage to be associated with
higher levels of external ﬁnance premium.
We also include a proﬁtability ratio (PROF), deﬁned as earnings
before interest and taxes relative to total assets, to measure a ﬁrm’s
ability to generate revenue. More proﬁtable ﬁrms have a greater
cushion for servicing debt and should pay lower spreads on their
loans (see Güntay and Hackbarth (2010)). Therefore, we expect a
negative relationship between this ratio and the external ﬁnance
premium.
Following Cremers et al. (2008) and Güntay and Hackbarth
(2010), we add equity returns (ROE), measured as net income over
shareholders’ equity, to control for the expected value of the ﬁrm.
A positive equity return, signals an improvement in the ﬁrm’s busi-
ness operations and therefore should be negatively related with
the external ﬁnance premium.
In our study we seek to control for bankruptcy risk by including
Z-scores. The Z-score (ZSCORE) measures the number of standard
deviations below the mean by which proﬁts would have to fall incorporate bond credit spread.
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ruptcy risk. The higher the Z-score the lower the ﬁrm’s risk, so we
expect this variable to have a negative effect on the bond premium.
Vector Zit includes a choice of bond-speciﬁc control variables
guided by the existing empirical literature on the determinants
of yield spreads. Speciﬁcally, we control for the maturity of the
bonds, and following Tsuji (2005) we construct a dummy which
takes the value one if the maturity of the bond is over 6 years,
and equal to zero otherwise (MATDUM). Bonds with maturity of
less than 6 years are generally considered to be short-term bonds,
while those with maturity above 6 years are considered to be med-
ium and long-term bonds. We expect a positive coefﬁcient since
yield spreads generally increase with maturity for investment
grade bonds. In addition, we augment our models with the loga-
rithm of the dollar amount originally issued (LNAMOUNT). Accord-
ing to Lu et al. (2010), the amount of bond issue can be used as an
external liquidity proxy and should be negatively related with
bond spreads since larger bond issues are associated with greater
bond liquidity and consequently lower spreads.
3.2. Financial constraints
We investigate whether particular segments of ﬁrms face a
higher external ﬁnance premium by considering the response of
external ﬁnance premium to different groups of ﬁrms. We follow
the established ﬁnancing constraints literature and deﬁne ﬁnan-
cially constrained and unconstrained ﬁrms using three classiﬁca-
tion schemes to ensure the robustness of our results, these are
size, creditworthiness and indebtedness. We use a 30 percent
cut-off point in keeping with the normal practice in the literature.8
We also allow ﬁrms to transit between ﬁrm classes.9 Therefore, we
generate a dummy variable Consit which indicates in turn small, ris-
ky and highly indebted ﬁrms. Size was employed as a criterion by
Bougheas et al. (2006) and Spaliara (2009) and is the key proxy for
capital market access by manufacturing ﬁrms in Gertler and Gilchrist
(1994) because small ﬁrms are more vulnerable to capital market
imperfections and thus more likely to be ﬁnancially constrained.
Firms that are more indebted (based on the leverage ratio) are more
likely to pay a higher external ﬁnance premium on bonds since they
have a greater probability of bankruptcy (Bougheas et al. (2006)),
which can raise the cost of borrowing, and negatively affect the
availability of credit. Finally, the coverage ratio, measured as earn-
ings before interest and taxes over total debt, can be used as a ﬁnan-
cial sample separation criterion because it measures project quality.
Interest coverage was used by Gertler and Gilchrist (1994) and
Guariglia (1999) as an indicator of the extent to which ﬁnancial con-
straints drive differences in inventory investment. The estimated
model is speciﬁed as follows:
yit ¼ ai þ XitConsitb1 þ Xitð1 ConsitÞb2 þ Zitcþ it ð5Þ
This speciﬁcation captures the impact of ﬁnancial constraints on the
response to balance sheet characteristics. If the difference of the
coefﬁcients of the interacted ﬁnancial variables is statistically sig-
niﬁcant we can conclude that ﬁrms classiﬁed as constrained face
a higher premium compared to their unconstrained counterparts.
3.3. The effects of ﬁnancial crises
Our sample spans two important extreme economic events,
namely the 1997–1998 Asian ﬁnancial crisis and the most recent8 Campello and Chen (2010) rank the sampled ﬁrms into constrained and
unconstrained using 30% and 70% cut-off points respectively from the Fama–French
portfolios.
9 For this reason, our empirical analysis will focus on ﬁrm-years rather than simply
ﬁrms. See Kaplan and Zingales (1997) for a similar approach.global ﬁnancial crisis. Therefore, it provides a natural experiment
to explore the impact of two separate ﬁnancial crises on the exter-
nal ﬁnance premium. We use a similar methodological approach to
previous studies that test for differences in the response of real
variables in periods of recession versus non-recession (c.f. Gertler
and Gilchrist (1994), Vermeulen (2002) and Mody and Taylor
(2004)) using interactions of a crisis dummy (CRISISt) with ﬁnancial
variables in vector Xit and the ﬁnancial constraints dummy (Consit).
yit ¼ ai þ XitConsitCRISIStb1 þ XitConsitð1 CRISIStÞb2
þ Xitð1 ConsitÞCRISIStb3 þþXitð1 ConsitÞð1 CRISIStÞb4
þ Zitcþ it ð6Þ
CRISISt ¼ ACDt takes the value one in years 1997–1998 and zero
otherwise to allow for the fact that the second half of 1997 saw
the unprecedented collapse of the stock markets and currencies of
ﬁve Asian countries – Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines
and South Korea with secondary effects through the rest of Asia.
There is evidence that the Asian crisis adversely inﬂuenced the abil-
ity of ﬁrms to access credit on international markets (see Calvo
(1999)) and therefore it is possible that ﬁnancially constrained
ﬁrms were hit the hardest. CRISISt ¼ GFCDt , which takes the value
one in years 2007–2009 and zero otherwise, determines the impact
of the recent ﬁnancial crisis on the external ﬁnance premium.
If the interacted terms during a crisis are signiﬁcantly different
from the same terms outside of a crisis, then the additional re-
sponse of the external ﬁnance premium to ﬁnancial variables dur-
ing the crisis is detectable compared to tranquil periods.
4. Data and summary statistics
4.1. Sample characterization
The data for this paper are drawn from Dealogic Bondware,
Bloomberg, and Thomson Financial Primark. We use Bondware to
identify all corporate bonds issued in international markets. This
database contains information about the issue dates, denomina-
tion, currency and the maturity in the bonds measured. We are also
able to identify the type of the coupon (i.e zero coupon, ﬁxed and
ﬂoating). All bonds issued in hard currency in China, Hong Kong,
Indonesia, Korea, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand were in-
cluded in the sample.10 The selection of the above countries takes
into account the fact that there is a wide degree of development in
the Asian markets.
We use Bloomberg to match all bonds issued in the domestic
Asian markets with the corresponding bond yields for the period
1995–2009. We collect end-of-December bond yields so as to guar-
antee consistency with our ﬁrm-speciﬁc data. Bloomberg also con-
tains data on the duration of each bond issue and its market value.
The matching of the bonds with the corporate yield was made fea-
sible using bond tickers. To address a potential concern regarding
illiquidity noise in our sample, we take two steps. First, in the ab-
sence of bid-ask spread data, we focus on bonds with maturity
greater than one year, since bonds that are near the end of their life
tend to trade less frequently. Second, we cross check the names of
the sampled ﬁrms with those in the i-Traxx Asia ex-Japan index.
This index is made up of the more liquid CDS contracts, which
can thus be traded as portfolios (see Remolona and Shim (2008)).
The use of such instruments has contributed to liquid, ﬂexible
and diverse corporate bond markets. We are able to identify more
than 25 percent of our sample in the i-Traxx index and these ﬁrms
will be the most liquid ﬁrms. Following Durbin and Ng (2005) and
Peter and Grandes (2005), we make reference to international10 Due to data limitations we were unable to retrieve any data on foreign currency
corporate bond yields for Malaysian ﬁrms.
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in local currency. This will help us to avoid any currency or transfer
risk which is associated with sovereign bonds.11 Our data contains
the benchmark Treasury yields from Datastream for maturities of 3,
5, 7, 10, and 30 years. For each corporate bond that matures at time t,
a US Treasury that has the same maturity is used to provide the risk-
free rate referred to in Bernanke et al. (1999), and in those cases
where there is no corresponding government bond, the equivalent
government bond is constructed and its yield estimated using a sim-
ple linear interpolation method.
Balance sheet data for ﬁrms in China, Hong Kong, Indonesia,
Korea, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand were taken from the
Thomson Financial Primark database. Following normal selection
criteria used in the literature, we excluded companies that did
not have complete records on our explanatory variables and
ﬁrm-years with negative sales. Most of ﬁrms report information
on their balance sheets and proﬁt (loss) accounts at the end of
December (ﬁnancial year-end). For ﬁrms report that report at the
end of March or in other months, we weight information from cur-
rent and previous annual reports to adjust all our ﬁrm-speciﬁc
variables to record information at the year end in December. To
control for the potential inﬂuence of outliers, we excluded observa-
tions in the 0.5 percent from upper and lower tails of the distribu-
tion of the regression variables.
Our combined sample contains data for 264 bonds issued by 91
Asian ﬁrms that traded between 1995 and 2009 in a variety of sec-
tors including manufacturing, utilities, resources, services and
ﬁnancials. The panel has an unbalanced structure with the number
of observations on each ﬁrm varying between three and ﬁfteen. To
ensure that our sample is representative we provide some graphi-
cal analysis. Speciﬁcally, we are interested to show that our dataset
is an accurate reﬂection of the universe of companies in Asia as re-
corded in the World Development Indicators (WDI) database,
which is provided by the World Bank. In Fig. 1 we compare the
average market capitalization as a percentage of GDP between
our dataset to all listed ﬁrms as recorded in the WDI database. If
the pattern between the two lines is similar we can conclude that
our sample is representative across the dimension mentioned
above. We observe that the two series are highly correlated and11 A potential downside of considering only international placements is that we do
not capture the full picture on Asian emerging markets since fewer corporates can
issue bonds denominated in hard currency, but we believe it is essential to avoid the
distortion that currency risks introduce, see Domowitz et al., 1998.exhibit virtually identical business cycle dynamics. We conclude
therefore that our sample is representative of the universe of listed
companies in Asia.
4.2. Descriptive analysis
By way of preliminary analysis, we show in Fig. 2 the average
credit spread between corporate and government bonds of the
same maturity issued by Asian ﬁrms in their respective bond mar-
kets across all countries. The most notable feature of this ﬁgure is
the sharp response to adverse economic events. Thus the increase
in the spread at the onset of the 1997–98 Asian crisis can be easily
observed. While the average spread increased during the crisis it is
also clear that in the ﬁnancial turbulence that followed during the
Brazilian crisis in 1998 and the Russian default in 1999, it re-
mained at elevated levels before returning to pre-crisis values until
2004. Moreover, the credit spread has grown steadily since 2007
reﬂecting the most recent global ﬁnancial crisis, but in terms of
its magnitude the increase in the credit spread during the ﬁnal
years of our sample is much smaller than the increase around
the time of the Asian crisis.
In Table 1we present summary statistics for the external ﬁnance
premium, asmeasured by the credit spreads. First, we begin by ana-
lyzing spreads by credit quality. Firms with Z-score above 1.91,
which are generally considered as safe ﬁrms, face lower spreads
compared to risky ﬁrms (Z-score less than or equal to 1.91) but the
difference is not statistically signiﬁcant, as shown by the p-value re-
ported in the ﬁnal column. When the sample is separated by the
average maturity of the bonds, we ﬁnd that bonds with average
maturity longer than 6 years (medium and long-term bonds) have
higher spreads and the difference is statistically signiﬁcant.
Second, we analyze spreads for smaller ﬁrms, ﬁrms with higher
indebtedness and those with low coverage ratios, which measure
the extent to which ﬁrms are likely to be ﬁnancially constrained.
We observe that constrained ﬁrms, irrespective of the deﬁnition,
experience higher spreads compared to their unconstrained coun-
terparts. The difference between these categories is signiﬁcant in
all cases but one. Taken together, these preliminary statistics sug-
gest that the external ﬁnance premium is larger for ﬁrms classiﬁed
as ﬁnancially constrained versus ﬁrms that are unconstrained
using three different deﬁnitions.
Third, during the Asian crisis the mean external ﬁnance pre-
mium was 8.45, while in the later global ﬁnancial crisis the mean
was 4.72. The premium was considerably smaller during the
Table 1
Summary statistics for the credit spread.
Mean (1) St. Deviation (2) Observations (3) Diff. (4)
Full sample 4.38 (12.68) 718
Z-score
above 1.91 3.67 (7.03) 342 0.15
less or equal 1.91 5.03 (16.18) 376
Maturity
above 6 years 5.15 (15.25) 458 0.03
less or equal 6 years 3.04 (5.67) 260
Firm types
Smallit 4.95 (11.07) 195 0.46
Largeit 4.17 (13.24) 523
H:Coverageit 3.91 (11.25) 594 0.02
L:Coverageit 6.65 (17.91) 124
H:Indebtedit 5.18 (14.53) 532 0.00
L:Indebtedit 2.12 (3.29) 186
Time periods
97–98 Asian crisis 8.45 (20.26) 82 0.00
Non-Asian crisis 3.86 (11.26) 636
07–09 global crisis 4.72 (9.94) 70 0.81
Non-global crisis 4.35 (12.95) 648
Notes: The table presents descriptive statistics for the ﬁrm-speciﬁc credit spread ðSPREADitÞ. The subscript i indexes ﬁrms, and the subscript t, time, where t = 1995–2009.
12 For example consider the ﬁrm’s reputation which can be acquired in the ﬁnancial
markets.
13 While our model is robust to ﬁrm-speciﬁc heterogeneity since we account for
these factors explicitly in our model, we may still encounter endogeneity bias. The
usual solution to endogeneity bias would be a dynamic GMM estimator with
instrumental variables, but we are unable to estimate a dynamic panel GMM-
estimator because of two important considerations. First, the Asian crisis occurs close
to the beginning of our sample, and thus the dynamic GMM-procedure poses a
problem for our study since the requirement for instruments and the use of ﬁrst
differences and lags of dependent variable would lead to a considerable loss of
observations, including the crisis period. This would substantially undermine the
asymmetric effects of the ﬁnancial accelerator, which are vitally important for this
study. Second, our sample is relatively short and when applying dynamic panel data
estimators to short samples one might be confronted with severe bias in the
estimates. In short samples Mulkay et al. (2000) point out that static estimation
procedure provides more precise estimates.
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but excluding the years 1997–1998) and the non-global crisis per-
iod. The difference for the mean external ﬁnance premium is statis-
tically signiﬁcant for the Asian crisis only.
To further illustrate the relevance of ﬁrm-level heterogeneity in
examining the credit spread, we present graphs of the evolution of
the credit spread broken down for those ﬁrms that are likely to be
ﬁnancially constrained and those that are unconstrained on three
different criteria. Fig. 3 shows that the average credit spread takes
a higher value for ﬁrms that are small, highly indebted and risky
compared to ﬁrms that are large, less indebted and relatively safe.
This is what we would expect, but we also see a larger and more
persistent effect following the Asian crisis for these ﬁrms, com-
pared to ﬁrms less likely to be ﬁnancially constrained. The re-
sponse of the external ﬁnancial premium for these types of ﬁrms
in the recent global ﬁnancial crisis has been a little higher but
not much compared to unconstrained companies. Only small ﬁrms
have seen a response in their spreads comparable to the Asian cri-
sis episode.
Having shown statistics for the external ﬁnance premium, we
now turn to the ﬁrm-speciﬁc indicators that we employ in our
empirical analysis. The upper panel of Table 2 reports means, stan-
dard deviations and the number of observations for the full sample.
In the middle panel of the Table we show the same information for
the ﬁrms in the upper 70th percentile and 30th percentile of the
spread distribution. In the bottom panel of the Table we distin-
guish between the Asian crisis and the global ﬁnancial crisis. We
ﬁnd that ﬁrms in the lower 30th percentile of the credit spread dis-
tribution are less indebted, more proﬁtable, less risky and have
higher equity returns compared to the median, and compared to
ﬁrms in the upper 70th percentile. When we examine the two
ﬁnancial crises, we observe that Asian ﬁrms displayed better ﬁnan-
cial health, in lower leverage, higher proﬁtability and lower bank-
ruptcy risk, during the most recent ﬁnancial crisis compared to the
Asian crisis. In sum, these preliminary statistics suggest that the
scale of the external ﬁnance premium is inversely related to the
strength of the balance sheet, and therefore ﬁrms with better
ﬁnancial health face lower external ﬁnance premia and vice versa.
In addition, they highlight the recent good ﬁnancial health that
Asian ﬁrms exhibited in contrast to the Asian crisis.
In the sections that followwe test the extent to which the exter-
nal ﬁnance premium varies with ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial condition, andhow this effect differs at ﬁrms more and less likely to face ﬁnanc-
ing constraints both during and after ﬁnancial crises.5. Results
5.1. External ﬁnance premium and ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics
We begin our enquiry with a baseline model as shown in Eq. (4).
Our empirical models are estimated using a ﬁxed effects approach
to control for any unobserved heterogeneity.12 Moreover, the
choice of ﬁxed effects approach is formally justiﬁed by using the
Hausman test. We report p-values of this test at the foot of the tables
of results. In all cases the Hausman test does not reject the null of no
correlation between the regressors and the individual effects, vindi-
cating the ﬁxed effects estimator.13
Table 3 reports the estimated coefﬁcients on the explanatory
variables, LEV, PROF, ROE, ZSCORE, MATDUM and LNAMOUNT in
the baseline model, which allows for country, time and industry
dummies. The resulting coefﬁcient estimates offer the response
averaged over all sectors, all size classes and all years in response
to each of the ﬁrm speciﬁc ﬁnancial variables. We show that ﬁrms
with higher leverage (LEV) will face a higher external ﬁnance pre-
mium compared to those with lower leverage, since the coefﬁcient
of 0.161 implies an elasticity of the bond premium with respect to
leverage, evaluated at sample means, of 0.853. A 10% increase in
leverage leads therefore to a 8.53% increase in credit spread. Proﬁt-
ability (PROF) appears not to be a signiﬁcant determinant of credit
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Fig. 3. Credit spread for different types of ﬁrms.
Table 2
Summary statistics for ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables.
LEVit (1) Obs. (2) Diff. (3) PROFit(4) Obs. (5) Diff. (6) ZSCOREit(7) Obs. (8) Diff. (9) ROEit (10) Obs. (11) Diff. (12)
Full sample 31.99 1761 5.51 1761 1.92 1379 17.16 992
(22.87) (11.29) (2.14) (19.87)
Spread Groups
Lower 30th 33.31 204 0.08 6.73 204 0.60 2.51 171 0.00 7.52 204 0.08
(21.99) (9.02) (2.42) (22.68)
Upper 70th 37.31 194 6.19 194 1.25 178 0.94 194
(24.09) (11.17) (2.07) (55.39)
Time periods
97–98 Asian crisis 35.72 275 0.00 4.21 275 0.00 1.64 259 0.00 1.63 275 0.64
(23.87) (8.34) (1.84) (11.85)
07–09 global crisis 26.61 86 8.07 86 2.57 52 1.04 86
(15.10) (9.91) (2.20) (1.81)
Notes: The Table reports sample means with standard deviations in parentheses for the ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables used in the empirical analysis. The p-value of a test of the
equality of means is reported. The subscript i indexes ﬁrms, and the subscript t, time, where t = 1995–2009. LEVit: Total debt to total assets. PROFit: Earnings before interest
and taxes relative to total assets. ZSCOREit: Altman’s Z-score, which is an indicator of bankruptcy risk. ROEit: Net income over shareholders’ equity.
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lower external ﬁnance premium consistentwith the view that high-
er equity returns increase the ﬁrmvalue thereby reducing the risk of
default. The elasticities of bond premiumwith respect to equity re-
turns is relatively small at 0.071. The Z-score variable also has asigniﬁcant negative coefﬁcient implying that ﬁrms with high Z-
score and therefore with lower bankruptcy risk, face a smaller pre-
mium, but here the elasticity is larger at0.635, suggesting the risk
measure has a greater impact on the spread than the return on equi-
ty. Finally, the coefﬁcients on the bond-speciﬁc controls (maturity
Table 3
External ﬁnance premium and ﬁrm characteristics.
LEVit 0.161⁄⁄⁄
(2.78)
PROFit 0.130
(1.18)
ROEit 0.344⁄
(1.95)
ZSCOREit 1.457⁄
(1.95)
MATDUM 1.206
(0.52)
LNAMOUNT 0.340
(0.53)
R2 0.10
Hausman (p-value) 0.00
Notes: The dependent variable is the credit spread, as deﬁned by
the difference between corporate bond yields and government
bond yields of the same maturity. Robust t-statistics are reported
in the round brackets. The standard errors are corrected for
clustering. Time dummies, industry dummies and country
dummies were included in the speciﬁcation. MATDUM is a
dummy which takes the value one if the maturity of the bond is
over 6 years, and equal to zero otherwise. LNAMOUNT denotes
the log of amount issued. The Hausman Test is distributed as a
chi-squared distribution under the null of no correlation
between the regressors and the individual effects. Numbers of
ﬁrms and of observations are 91 and 594, respectively. Also see
notes to Table 2. ⁄⁄Signiﬁcant at 5%.
⁄ Signiﬁcant at 10%.
⁄⁄⁄ Signiﬁcant at 1%.
Table 4
The role of ﬁnancial constraints.
SIZE (1) COV (2) INDEBT (3)
LEVit  Cons 0.275⁄⁄⁄ 0.419⁄⁄⁄ 0.232⁄⁄⁄
(3.60) (4.67) (3.95)
LEVit  (1  Cons) 0.144⁄⁄ 0.128⁄⁄ 0.174
(2.38) (2.34) (0.61)
PROFit  Cons 0.219 0.987⁄⁄ 0.104
(1.10) (2.10) (0.90)
PROFit  (1  Cons) 0.114 0.205⁄⁄ 0.216
(1.01) (1.97) (1.13)
ROEit  Cons 0.029 0.050 0.030
(0.66) (1.05) (1.45)
ROEit  (1  Cons) 0.024 0.001 0.029
(1.03) (0.04) (0.18)
ZSCOREit  Cons 1.574⁄ 3.212⁄⁄ 1.933⁄⁄
(1.88) (2.79) (2.32)
ZSCOREit  (1  Cons) 1.369 1.518⁄⁄ 1.597
(1.29) (1.97) (1.32)
MATDUM 0.620 1.502 1.457
(0.25) (0.63) (0.60)
LNAMOUNT 0.103 0.356 0.266
(0.15) (0.56) (0.40)
R2 0.12 0.18 0.12
Hausman (p-value) 0.04 0.00 0.10
Test of equality (p-value): LEV 0.07 0.00 0.83
Test of equality (p-value): PROF 0.09 0.01 0.08
Test of equality (p-value): ROE 0.91 0.34 0.71
Test of equality (p-value): ZSCORE 0.84 0.08 0.77
Notes: The dependent variable is the credit spread, as deﬁned by the difference
between corporate bond yields and government bond yields of the same maturity.
The dummy variable Cons indicates in turn Small, Risky and Highly indebted ﬁrms.
Robust t-statistics are reported in the round brackets. The standard errors are
corrected for clustering. Time dummies, industry dummies and country dummies
were included in the speciﬁcations. The Hausman Test is distributed as a chi-
squared distribution under the null of no correlation between the regressors and
the individual effects. Numbers of ﬁrms and of observations are 91 and 594,
respectively. Also see notes to Table 2.
⁄ Signiﬁcant at 10%.
⁄⁄ Signiﬁcant at 5%.
⁄⁄⁄ Signiﬁcant at 1%.
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that these variables do not play a statistically signiﬁcant effect on
the external ﬁnance premium.14
While our results refer to a panel of seven economies, we are
able to assess country differences by looking at the corresponding
country dummies.15 We ﬁnd that relative to Hong Kong – here used
as the reference country – all countries, with the exception of China,
show a negative sign of the coefﬁcient, although they are not signif-
icant. The country dummy on China turns out to be positive and sig-
niﬁcant. In other words, we ﬁnd that ﬁrms located in China, pay a
higher external ﬁnance premium compared to ﬁrms in Hong Kong,
while ﬁrms in all other countries do not have signiﬁcantly different
premia compared to Hong Kong, all else equal.
The estimated coefﬁcients on the balance sheet variables have
the correct sign as predicted by the ﬁnancial accelerator theory
(see Bernanke et al. (1999)) as well as previous studies in the
determinants of credit spreads (see for instance Collin-Dufresne
et al. (2001), Cremers et al. (2008) and Güntay and Hackbarth
(2010)), and suggest that leverage and the risk of bankruptcy are
highly signiﬁcant determinants of the bond market external
ﬁnance premium.5.2. The role of ﬁnancial constraints
We now consider the impact of ﬁnancial constraints on the re-
sponse to balance sheet characteristics as shown in Eq. (5). We use
three different categorization methods for determining whether a
ﬁrm is constrained (Consit) or unconstrained (1  Consit) based on
size, creditworthiness and the degree of indebtedness. Our results
are remarkably consistent across these categories and document
an ‘excess sensitivity’ of ﬁnancial variables for constrained Asian14 We have also attempted to remove these bond-speciﬁc controls from our model
and the results remain unchanged.
15 Ideally, we would like to run regressions on a country-by-country basis, but due
to the limited number of observations we were not able to carry-out such an
econometric exercise.ﬁrms. We report formal tests of equality of coefﬁcients at the foot
of the Table of results. The upshot is that the external ﬁnance pre-
mium for bonds is larger for ﬁrms classiﬁed as ﬁnancially con-
strained versus ﬁrms that are unconstrained on a wide range of
classiﬁcations of ﬁnancially constrained.
Results are reported in Table 4. We observe that leverage (LEV)
has a positive and signiﬁcant effect for both types of ﬁrms (con-
strained and unconstrained). However, the coefﬁcients on con-
strained and unconstrained ﬁrms are signiﬁcantly different from
each other for two out of three measures we use to identify ﬁrms
as ﬁnancially constrained. This result shows that greater leverage
is more acute for constrained ﬁrms lending support to the ﬁnanc-
ing constraints story. The effect of leverage on the spread is not
only statistically but also economically important. For instance,
using our results for ﬁrms sorted on their size, as shown in Column
1 of Table 4, the elasticity of spread with respect to leverage is 0.63
for constrained Asian ﬁrms. Thus a 10% increase in leverage for
constrained ﬁrms implies a 6.3% increase in credit spread.16
The proﬁtability measure, PROF, has negative and signiﬁcant
coefﬁcients only for ﬁrms which face binding ﬁnancing constraints,
and only when COV is used as sorting device, while it is generally
insigniﬁcant for unconstrained companies. In addition, formal tests
of equality reported at the foot of the table reveal that the inter-
acted coefﬁcients are signiﬁcantly different from each other. In
terms of economic signiﬁcance, the effect of proﬁts on constrained16 This elasticity refers to Column 1 when we use SIZE to determine constraints, but
similar elasticities emerge for using COV as an alternative classiﬁcation scheme.
Table 5
Responses to the Asian crisis.
SIZE (1) COV (2) INDEBT (3)
LEVit  Cons  ACD 0.423⁄⁄ 0.546⁄⁄ 0.205⁄
(2.14) (2.22) (1.81)
LEVit  Cons  (1  ACD) 0.194 0.375 0.172⁄⁄
(1.34) (1.59) (2.46)
LEVit  (1  Cons)  ACD 0.089 0.100 18.680
(1.33) (1.46) (0.75)
LEVit  (1  Cons)  (1  ACD) 0.122 0.117 0.131
(1.03) (1.58) (0.46)
PROFit  Cons  ACD 1.871⁄⁄⁄ 2.684⁄⁄ 1.033⁄⁄⁄
(3.82) (2.32) (3.49)
PROFit  Cons  (1  ACD) 0.074 0.014 0.033
(0.49) (0.02) (0.26)
PROFit  (1  Cons)  ACD 0.260 0.061 116.934
(1.42) (0.24) (0.75)
PROFit  (1  Cons)  (1  ACD) 0.123 0.206⁄ 0.248
(1.22) (1.98) (1.31)
ROEit  Cons  ACD 0.052 0.043 0.042
(1.36) (1.39) (1.45)
ROEit  Cons  (1  ACD) 0.048 0.006 0.025
(1.15) (0.07) (0.93)
ROEit  (1  Cons)  ACD 0.009 0.010 0.094
(1.08) (1.45) (0.04)
ROEit  (1  Cons)  (1  ACD) 0.029⁄ 0.001 0.015
(1.76) (0.04) (0.09)
ZSCOREit  Cons  ACD 6.770⁄⁄ 11.484⁄⁄ 5.329⁄⁄⁄
(2.12) (2.50) (3.56)
ZSCOREit  Cons  (1  ACD) 1.227 2.023⁄⁄ 1.689⁄⁄
(0.65) (2.29) (2.00)
ZSCOREit  (1  Cons)  ACD 3.967⁄⁄ 4.737⁄⁄⁄ 27.773
(2.29) (3.56) (0.79)
ZSCOREit  (1  Cons)  (1  ACD) 1.264 1.190 1.583
(1.38) (0.90) (1.32)
MATDUM 1.298 2.089 0.925
(0.53) (0.89) (0.38)
LNAMOUNT 0.260 0.357 0.448
(0.50) (0.66) (0.68)
R2 0.19 0.22 0.15
Hausman (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00
Test of equality (p-value): LEV  Cons 0.33 0.38 0.78
Test of equality (p-value): LEV  1  Cons 0.66 0.75 0.45
Test of equality (p-value): PROF  Cons 0.00 0.02 0.00
Test of equality (p-value): PROF  1  Cons 0.04 0.46 0.45
Test of equality (p-value): ROE  Cons 0.09 0.69 0.67
Test of equality (p-value): ROE  1  Cons 0.17 0.54 0.97
Test of equality (p-value): ZSCORE  Cons 0.09 0.03 0.01
Test of equality (p-value): ZSCORE  1  Cons 0.22 0.02 0.43
Notes: The dependent variable is the credit spread, as deﬁned by the difference between corporate bond yields and government bond yields of the same maturity. ACD is a
dummy variable, which takes value 1 for the 1997–1998 Asian crisis period, and 0 otherwise. The dummy variable Cons indicates in turn Small, Risky and Highly indebted
ﬁrms. Robust t-statistics are reported in the round brackets. The standard errors are corrected for clustering. Time dummies, industry dummies and country dummies were
included in the speciﬁcations. The Hausman Test is distributed as a chi-squared distribution under the null of no correlation between the regressors and the individual effects.
Numbers of ﬁrms and of observations are 91 and 594, respectively. Also see notes to Table 2.
⁄ Signiﬁcant at 10%.
⁄⁄ Signiﬁcant at 5%.
⁄⁄⁄ signiﬁcant at 1%.
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signiﬁcant.
The return on equity, ROE, has a negative coefﬁcient for both
constrained and unconstrained ﬁrms but the coefﬁcients are insig-
niﬁcant for both types of ﬁrms. Our results in Table 4 do not sug-
gest an important role for equity returns in the external ﬁnance
premium even when we differentiate between constrained and
unconstrained ﬁrms.
The risk of default, as measured by the Z-SCORE, is found to be
negative and signiﬁcant for the constrained group of ﬁrms for all
three measures, while for unconstrained ﬁrms we ﬁnd only one
case where it has a negative and signiﬁcant effect. We identify
one case where the coefﬁcients are statistically different between
constrained and unconstrained ﬁrms. In keeping with our previousresults we ﬁnd that this variable has a strong inﬂuence on the pre-
mium, but we reveal here that the inﬂuence is much stronger on
constrained ﬁrms than unconstrained ﬁrms, where the risk of
bankruptcy is likely to be much higher.
Our results show that it is the constrained ﬁrms, by any deﬁni-
tion we used, that show greater sensitivity to ﬁnancial variables,
with special emphasis on leverage and the risk of default. Fazzari
et al. (1988), Guariglia (2008) and Spaliara (2009) found that cap-
ital market imperfections are important in inﬂuencing ﬁrms’ real
activities such as investment, inventory and employment. We ﬁnd
that the external premium on corporate bonds is also more sensi-
tive to balance sheet characteristics for constrained ﬁrms than for
unconstrained ﬁrms. This is a new result that complements the
earlier work by de Bondt (2004) and Campello and Chen (2010)
Table 6
The 2007–2009 global ﬁnancial crisis.
SIZE (1) COV (2) INDEBT (3)
LEVit  Cons  GFCD 0.594⁄ 0.003 0.268⁄
(1.83) (0.01) (1.77)
LEVit  Cons  (1  GFCD) 0.316⁄⁄⁄ 0.435⁄ 0.225⁄
(4.12) (1.88) (1.88)
LEVit  (1  Cons)  GFCD 0.032 0.117 0.473
(0.13) (1.42) (1.23)
LEVit  (1  Cons)  (1  GFCD) 0.160⁄⁄⁄ 0.121 0.115
(2.66) (1.55) (0.50)
PROFit  Cons  GFCD 12.755⁄⁄⁄ 2.861⁄⁄ 0.807
(3.47) (2.25) (0.82)
PROFit  Cons  (1  GFCD) 0.190 0.086 0.101
(0.97) (0.10) (0.88)
PROFit  (1  Cons)  GFCD 0.340 0.674 0.133
(0.54) (1.41) (0.42)
PROFit  (1  Cons)  (1  GFCD) 0.098 0.201⁄ 0.219⁄⁄
(0.86) (1.85) (2.11)
ROEit  Cons  GFCD 4.785⁄⁄⁄ 0.052 0.961
(2.84) (0.51) (1.12)
ROEit  Cons  (1  GFCD) 0.032 0.009 0.029⁄
(0.73) (0.09) (1.98)
ROEit  (1  Cons)  GFCD 0.082 0.359 0.261
(0.15) (0.71) (0.62)
ROEit  (1  Cons)  (1  GFCD) 0.023 0.000 0.011
(1.01) (0.02) (0.12)
ZSCOREit  Cons  GFCD 9.315⁄ 6.007 0.283
(1.93) (1.47) (0.11)
ZSCOREit  Cons  (1  GFCD) 2.145⁄⁄ 2.691⁄⁄⁄ 2.201⁄
(1.97) (2.70) (1.92)
ZSCOREit  (1  Cons)  GFCD 1.159 0.902 1.590
(0.71) (0.51) (1.04)
ZSCOREit  (1  Cons)  (1  GFCD) 1.759⁄⁄ 1.605 1.702⁄
(2.09) (1.39) (1.70)
MATDUM 0.709 2.529 1.331
(0.29) (1.07) (0.63)
LNAMOUNT 0.174 0.279 0.201
(0.26) (0.54) (0.38)
R2 0.16 0.21 0.13
Hausman (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.35
Test of equality (p-value): LEV  Cons 0.38 0.95 0.76
Test of equality (p-value): LEV  1-Cons 0.59 0.09 0.21
Test of equality (p-value): PROF  Cons 0.00 0.08 0.35
Test of equality (p-value): PROF  1-Cons 0.70 0.32 0.79
Test of equality (p-value): ROE  Cons 0.00 0.76 0.28
Test of equality (p-value): ROE  1-Cons 0.85 0.47 0.48
Test of equality (p-value): ZSCORE  Cons 0.08 0.41 0.22
Test of equality (p-value): ZSCORE  1-Cons 0.70 0.53 0.92
Notes: The dependent variable is the credit spread, as deﬁned by the difference between corporate bond yields and government bond yields of the same maturity. GFCD is a
dummy variable, which takes value 1 for the global ﬁnancial risis period 2007–2009, and 0 otherwise. The dummy variable Cons indicates in turn Small, Risky and Highly
indebted ﬁrms. Robust t-statistics are reported in the round brackets. The standard errors are corrected for clustering. Time dummies, industry dummies and country
dummies were included in the speciﬁcations. The Hausman Test is distributed as a chi-squared distribution under the null of no correlation between the regressors and the
individual effects. Numbers of ﬁrms and of observations are 91 and 594, respectively. Also see notes to Table 2.
⁄ Signiﬁcant at 10%.
⁄⁄ signiﬁcant at 5%.
⁄⁄⁄ Signiﬁcant at 1%.
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bond markets. Greater sensitivity may result from the greater
information asymmetries in Asia between ﬁrms and the ‘arms-
length’ investors in bonds, and this results to some degree from
the smaller, less liquid and transparent bond market in the Asian
region compared to the West.1717 It should be noted that there is a range of ﬁnancial development in Asia, and
certainly Hong Kong, Korea and Singapore are well developed compared to the other
Asian countries in our paper. Nevertheless, there is some recognition in the region
that the bond market is relatively underdeveloped and that corporate ﬁnance is
primarily bank based, or for larger ﬁrms, equity based.5.3. Responses to crises
5.3.1. The Asian crisis
This section addresses the response to the crisis by examining
the sensitivity of the external premium to ﬁnancial variables in
the 1997–1998 crisis for the Asian ﬁrms. We report coefﬁcients
on variables interacted with the dummy variable ACDt (Asian cri-
sis) and interacted with ð1 ACDtÞ (out of Asian crisis) for con-
strained and unconstrained ﬁrms.
Our results in Table 5 give a clear indication that there is a sig-
niﬁcantly different response of the external ﬁnance premium dur-
ing the crisis with respect to ﬁnancial variables compared to other
times. When ACDt is interacted with constrained (Consit) and
unconstrained ð1 ConsitÞ ﬁrms, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant effects for
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during the crisis (i.e rows where the ACDt  ðConsitÞ interaction is
explored) but insigniﬁcant results for other periods. Our results
show that where there is a signiﬁcant difference in the response
for constrained versus unconstrained ﬁrms, the external ﬁnance
premium is more sensitive to LEV, PROF and ZSCORE for con-
strained ﬁrms in the crisis.
In Table 4 we found greater sensitivity for constrained ﬁrms,
but did not differentiate between crisis and non-crisis episodes. Ta-
ble 5 shows that the Asian crisis intensiﬁed the effects of the con-
straints and many constrained ﬁrms with higher leverage or risk of
default and lower proﬁts faced signiﬁcant increases in their exter-
nal ﬁnance premia. The impact is measurable, based on elasticities
at the mean. We calculate that a 10% rise in leverage is associated
with a 1.41% increase in credit spread, while an identical increase
in proﬁtability and Z-score is associated with a 0.2% and a 1.05%
fall in the credit spread for constrained ﬁrms during the Asian crisis
period. We conclude that the 1997–1998 crisis had a considerable
impact through the balance sheet on external ﬁnance premium in
the Asian bond market.
5.3.2. The global ﬁnancial crisis
We carry-out a similar exercise to the previous sub-section, but
our focus is on the most recent ﬁnancial crisis. It is well known that
the 2007–2009 ﬁnancial crisis and global economic downturn did
not originate in Asia, with the US being the epicenter of the crisis.
In addition, compared to 1997–1998, Asian countries in structural
terms were generally in good shape. For instance, Kim (2010) notes
that Korean companies during the 1997–1998 crisis had substan-
tially higher debt ratios and considerably lower interest coverage
ratios compared with the global ﬁnancial crisis. This is also con-
ﬁrmed in our data, since we show in Table 2 that Asian ﬁrms dur-
ing the 1997–1998 crisis were more indebted, less proﬁtable and
riskier compared to the later years of our sample which span the
2007–2009 global ﬁnancial crisis. Nonetheless, the second round
effects of the crisis have inﬂuenced Asia as foreign investors have
withdrawn capital to home markets, and have required higher re-
turns to compensate for the perceived risks of investing abroad.
To assess whether the external ﬁnance premium in the bond
market was signiﬁcantly higher during the global crisis for con-
strained ﬁrms relative to their unconstrained counterparts, we
estimate Eq. (6) interacted with the dummy variable GFCDt
(2007–2009 crisis) and interacted with ð1 GFCDtÞ (out of 2007–
2009 crisis) for constrained (Consit) and unconstrained
ð1 ConsitÞ ﬁrms.
The results are shown in Table 6. We ﬁnd much less sensitivity
to leverage and risk in the recent crisis compared to the response
to the Asian crisis. External ﬁnance premia do rise by a similar
magnitude in response to these variables for constrained ﬁrms,
but the effect is not as statistically signiﬁcant, and less consistent
across measures of ﬁnancial constraints. We ﬁnd instead that prof-
itability and return on equity become more important than they
were in the Asian crisis, with Table 6 showing much stronger sig-
niﬁcance for these variables than Table 5. Based on results in Col-
umn 1 of Table 6, a 10% rise in proﬁtability leads to a 21.9% fall in
external premium for constrained Asian ﬁrm-years during the glo-
bal ﬁnancial crisis.
The differences may reﬂect the fact the Asian ﬁrms were more
indebted at the onset of the Asian crisis, and more sensitive to
the withdrawal of external ﬁnance; bankruptcy was a real possibil-
ity for many ﬁrms as credit tightened. In the recent crisis Asian
ﬁrms had lower debt levels, and much more internal ﬁnance to fall
back on when external ﬁnance was limited in supply. Asian ﬁnan-
cial institutions entered the global ﬁnancial crisis with limited
exposure to subprime-related instruments, and most had relatively
healthy ﬁnancial positions and strong capital buffers. Moreover,the currencies of these countries were protected by large foreign
exchange reserves, lowering the currency risk for foreign investors
in these countries. It is also a reﬂection of the second-round impact
of the global ﬁnancial crisis, as ﬁrst round effects on credit and de-
mand impacted on Asian ﬁrms and reduced their proﬁtability and
return on equity so investors raised the premiums they required on
bond ﬁnance.
We conclude that the external shocks emanating from ad-
vanced economies were better weathered by Asian economies dur-
ing 2009 compared with the 1997–1998 Asian crisis. The period of
the global ﬁnancial crisis only moderately affected the external ﬁ-
nance premium for constrained ﬁrms across the Asian region and
mostly through the channels of proﬁtability and return on equity
rather than leverage and risk of bankruptcy.6. Conclusions
In this paper we examine how the external premium responds
to ﬁrm-level balance sheet information using an asymmetric infor-
mation framework to explore the effect of ﬁrm-level heterogeneity,
credit constraints and crisis episodes on the bond spread (or exter-
nal ﬁnance premium). Our results based on ﬁrm-level data for
Asian bond markets during the period 1995–2009 suggest that
ﬁrms with better ﬁnancial health, as measured by balance sheet
indicators such as leverage, risk of bankruptcy, proﬁtability and re-
turn on equity, face a lower external ﬁnance premium. After sepa-
rating ﬁrms into constrained and unconstrained categories using
three different classiﬁcation schemes we ﬁnd ﬁrms that are credit
constrained tend to face higher premia compared to unconstrained
ﬁrms if their ﬁnancial position deteriorates. We also ﬁnd that con-
strained ﬁrms were more sensitive to leverage and risk of bank-
ruptcy measures during the Asian crisis of 1997, but were less
responsive to these measures in the most recent crisis, when prof-
itability and return on equity were the determinants of the exter-
nal ﬁnance premium.
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